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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
 In this federal follow-up to a foreclosure case, Michael 
Earl Davis is pursuing a variety of claims against an entity 
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that he calls “Wells Fargo U.S. Bank National Association as 
Trustee for the Structured Asset Investment Loan Trust, 
2005-11.”  It is the purported holder of Davis’s mortgage, and 
we will refer to it as “Wells Fargo” or “the bank.”1  Davis has 
also sued Assurant, Inc., believing it to be the provider of 
insurance on his home.  His claims against both Wells Fargo 
and Assurant arise from damage that occurred to his house 
after Wells Fargo had locked him out of it, damage that went 
unrepaired and worsened into severe structural problems.  
The United States District Court for the Eastern District of 
Pennsylvania dismissed Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, 
pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), on the 
grounds that claim preclusion and a statute of limitations 
barred recovery.  We will affirm that portion of the District 
Court’s order. 
 
 The District Court also dismissed all of Davis’s claims 
against Assurant, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
12(b)(1), for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  The Court 
reasoned that Davis lacked standing to bring those claims 
because he sued the wrong corporate entity, namely Assurant, 
when he should have sued Assurant’s wholly-owned 
                                              
 1 In its brief, Wells Fargo contends that Davis has 
actually treated two distinct entities as one.  It says that, 
“Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., is the servicer for U.S. Bank with 
respect to [Davis]’s mortgage loan.”  (Answering Br. at 2 
n.2.)  Davis’s ability, or lack thereof, to distinguish between 
different corporate entities animates much of this appeal and 
has had important consequences.  Any distinction between 
Wells Fargo and U.S. Bank is, however, irrelevant for our 
current purposes, as we will affirm the dismissal of all claims 
against the bank Davis is trying to sue, whatever its name. 
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subsidiary, American Security Insurance Company (“ASIC”).  
That conclusion about standing was in error.  Standing is 
indeed a jurisdictional predicate, but, rightly understood, this 
case is not about standing at all.  An analysis of standing 
generally focuses on whether the plaintiff is the right party to 
bring particular claims, not on whether the plaintiff has sued 
the right party.  The latter question goes not to standing and 
jurisdiction but to the merits of the claims themselves.  
Therefore, the District Court erred in considering the claims 
against Assurant under Rule 12(b)(1) rather than Rule 
12(b)(6).  That difference has important consequences here.  
In the end, the difference between those rules of procedure 
dictates that we vacate that portion of the District Court’s 
order dismissing Davis’s breach of contract claim against 
Assurant and remand for further proceedings. 
 
I. BACKGROUND 
 
 A. Factual Background2 
 
 Davis is a resident of Philadelphia.  On July 29, 2005, 
he executed a mortgage on a house there (“the Property”), 
with BNC Mortgage, Inc. (“BNC”) as the mortgagee.  Two-
and-a-half years later, on January 5, 2008, it was Wells Fargo 
that – claiming to be an assignee of the mortgage – locked 
Davis out of the Property.  The amended complaint alleges 
that Wells Fargo did so “on the pretense that it held a valid 
mortgage contract” (S28), but that it, in fact, acted without 
                                              
 2 For purposes of the motions to dismiss under Rule 
12(b)(6), we recount the facts as alleged by the non-movant, 
Davis, accepting them as true.  Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 
578 F.3d 203, 210 (3d Cir. 2009). 
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holding the note, a mortgage assignment, or any other legal 
interest in the Property.  Three weeks later, on January 24, 
2008, Wells Fargo commenced a foreclosure action against 
Davis in state court, in which it obtained a default judgment.  
The details of how and when Davis’s mortgage was assigned 
to Wells Fargo are not clear from the record before us, but we 
do know that on February 8, 2008, Mortgage Electronic 
Registration Systems, Inc. (“MERS”), as nominee for BNC, 
purported to assign the mortgage to Wells Fargo.  Davis 
alleges that BNC had not authorized MERS to assign the 
mortgage or note to Wells Fargo, rendering the assignment 
“fraudulent.”  (S4, ¶11.)  Regardless, the assignment was 
recorded in Philadelphia County on February 20, 2008.  As 
the foregoing dates show, this assignment was made after 
Davis had already been locked out of the Property and after 
foreclosure proceedings had already begun. 
 
 Davis is also a Lieutenant Colonel in the United States 
Army Reserve, and, on September 15, 2008, the Army placed 
him on active duty.  He promptly provided a copy of his 
military orders to Wells Fargo, because of the foreclosure 
action that it had brought against him.  Upon receiving the 
copy of those orders, Wells Fargo filed a motion to vacate the 
default judgment it had obtained.  The judgment was vacated 
shortly thereafter.   
 
 Davis remained on active duty from October 1, 2008, 
through October 1, 2011.  While he was away, in April 2009, 
Wells Fargo obtained “force-placed” insurance on the 
Property, i.e., insurance placed by a mortgagee rather than the 
property owner.  The identity of the carrier is in dispute.  
According to Assurant, the carrier is ASIC, a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of Assurant.  Davis has alleged that Assurant is the 
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entity actually responsible for the insurance coverage.  
Davis’s amended complaint also alleges that Wells Fargo and 
Assurant conspired to extract excessive premiums from him 
through the force-placed insurance, in a scheme that paid 
Wells Fargo kickbacks in exchange for the bank making 
Assurant the exclusive provider of force-placed insurance for 
bank-related properties.   
 
 Less than two weeks after Davis returned from active 
duty, on October 12, 2011, MERS, as nominee for BNC, 
again purported to assign Davis’s mortgage on the Property to 
Wells Fargo.  Soon thereafter, Wells Fargo inspected the 
Property and “discovered a roof leak in the master bedroom 
that was also damaging the ceiling, wall and flooring” (S5 
¶19), and the following day filed an insurance claim.  An 
adjuster examined the property and filed a report estimating 
that repairs would cost $817.  The amended complaint alleges 
that, in late November, 2011, “Wells Fargo and Assurant 
Insurance Company fraudulently negotiated a $317 settlement 
of the roof leak damage claim that did not address the roof.” 
(S5 ¶22.)  Exhibits to the amended complaint indicate that the 
$317 payment is the amount of the adjuster’s damage 
assessment, after a $500 deductible.  Wells Fargo kept the 
money.  Despite the insurance claim it made, the bank did not 
fix the leak, and the Property continued to deteriorate.  All of 
this occurred without Davis’s knowledge. 
 
 Nearly a year later, Davis received a notice from the 
City of Philadelphia, saying that the Property had been 
designated unsafe due to a partially collapsed wall.  The 
notice directed Davis to make all necessary repairs or take 
down the wall within 30 days.  Still locked out, Davis told 
Wells Fargo of the problem and obtained access to the 
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Property.  He filed a claim with Assurant the next day for the 
property damage, being unaware that Wells Fargo had already 
settled a claim for the roof leak.  Assurant denied his claim on 
October 28, 2012. 
 
 B. Procedural Background 
 
 Earlier that same month, on October 18, 2012, Davis 
brought his first lawsuit against Wells Fargo in the District 
Court.  Davis v. U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 2:12-cv-05943-
TJS (the “2012 action”).  He filed an amended, two-count 
complaint on December 7, 2012, asserting claims against 
Wells Fargo for trespass and violation of the Servicemembers 
Civil Relief Act, 50 U.S.C. §§ 3901, et seq. (“SCRA”).3  The 
District Court dismissed the SCRA claim and declined to 
exercise supplemental jurisdiction over the state-law trespass 
claim.  The Court went on to explain that Davis would not be 
barred by the statute of limitations from reasserting his 
trespass claim if he “promptly file[d] a certified transcript of 
the judgment and pleadings” from the District Court in a 
court of the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania. (S279 n.1; see 
also 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5103(b).)  Unfortunately for Davis, 
he did not do so. 
 
 Instead, he waited nearly two years and then 
commenced this second action in the District Court on 
December 11, 2014.  In his amended complaint in the present 
case, he makes claims against Wells Fargo for trespass 
(Count I), breach of contract (Count II), negligence (Count 
                                              
 3 At the time Davis filed his amended complaint in the 
2012 action, SCRA was codified at 50 U.S.C. app. §§ 501, et 
seq. 
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IV), fraud (Count VI), breach of the implied covenant of good 
faith and fair dealing (Count X), and violation of the anti-
tying provision of the Bank Holding Company Act, 12 U.S.C. 
§§ 1972, et seq. (Count XI).  The amended complaint also 
asserts claims against Assurant for breach of contract (Count 
III), negligence (Count V), fraud (Count VI), and bad faith 
(Count VII).  Finally, the amended complaint requests that the 
mortgage assignments to Wells Fargo be set aside as 
fraudulent (Count IX).4 
 
 Wells Fargo moved to dismiss the claims asserted 
against it pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6), and Assurant moved to 
dismiss the claims asserted against it pursuant to Rules 
12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6).  With its motion, Assurant filed a 
signed declaration from one of its corporate officers 
distinguishing Assurant from ASIC as separate corporate 
entities.  The District Court granted both motions in an 
opinion and order dated June 8, 2015.  Davis v. Wells Fargo 
U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-07014, 2015 WL 3555301 
(E.D. Pa. June 8, 2015).  The Court dismissed all of Davis’s 
                                              
4 The amended complaint also included a claim against 
both Wells Fargo and Assurant for “loss of rental income” 
(Count VIII).  (S27.)  The District Court dismissed that count 
because it concluded the loss of rental income “claim” was an 
element of damages rather than a distinct cause of action.  
Davis v. Wells Fargo U.S. Bank Nat’l Ass’n, No. 14-07014, 
2015 WL 3555301, at *7 (E.D. Pa. June 8, 2015).  Davis does 
not dispute that conclusion on appeal, so we regard any 
argument as to that count to be waived and will affirm the 
dismissal of that count.  See Albrecht v. Horn, 485 F.3d 103, 
113 n.3 (3d Cir. 2007) (“An issue that is not discussed in the 
briefs is waived.”). 
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claims against Wells Fargo, with the exception of his trespass 
claim, on the basis of claim preclusion, because it determined 
that Davis could have brought those claims in his 2012 action.  
It dismissed the trespass claim as time-barred under 
Pennsylvania’s two-year statute of limitations.  The Court 
also dismissed all of Davis’s claims against Assurant under 
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, 
concluding that Davis had no Article III standing to assert 
them because he should have filed suit against ASIC instead 
of Assurant. 
 
 Davis filed a timely notice of appeal. 
 
II. DISCUSSION5 
 
 Because this case involves the grant of two separate 
motions to dismiss, we consider each in turn.  We start our 
review with Wells Fargo’s motion to dismiss under Federal 
Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), and then turn to Assurant’s 
motion under Rule (12)(b)(1).  Because we conclude that the 
District Court’s grant of Assurant’s motion under Rule 
12(b)(1) was error, we will also consider Assurant’s 
alternative argument that the District Court’s order should be 
affirmed on the basis of Rule 12(b)(6) because Davis failed to 
state a claim. 
 
                                              
 5 Wells Fargo rightly concedes that, under 28 U.S.C. 
§§ 1331, 1332, and 1367, the District Court had jurisdiction 
over the claims against it.  The District Court’s jurisdiction 
over Assurant is squarely at issue in this case, and we address 
it herein.  We have appellate jurisdiction to review a final 
decision of the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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 A. Wells Fargo’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule  
  12(b)(6) 
 
 For purposes of reviewing a motion to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(6), we are “required to accept as true all 
allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that 
can be drawn from them after construing them in the light 
most favorable to the nonmovant.”  Foglia v. Renal Ventures 
Mgmt., LLC, 754 F.3d 153, 154 n.1 (3d Cir. 2014) (quotation 
marks and citation omitted).  However, we disregard legal 
conclusions and recitals of the elements of a cause of action 
supported by mere conclusory statements.  Santiago v. 
Warminster Twp., 629 F.3d 121, 128 (3d Cir. 2010) (citation 
omitted).  “In deciding a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, a court must 
consider only the complaint, exhibits attached to the 
complaint, matters of public record, as well as undisputedly 
authentic documents if the complainant’s claims are based 
upon these documents.”  Mayer v. Belichick, 605 F.3d 223, 
230 (3d Cir. 2010). 
 
  (1) Claim Preclusion 
 
 Davis first argues that the District Court erred in 
holding that many of his claims against Wells Fargo were 
barred by the doctrine of claim preclusion, also referred to as 
res judicata.  The Court concluded that claim preclusion 
required dismissal of those claims – though not his claim of 
trespass – because they could have been brought at the time 
of his 2012 action.  It reasoned that Davis was aware of all of 
the facts necessary to assert his “new” claims prior to the 
filing of his amended complaint in the 2012 action.  We 
agree. 
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 Claim preclusion bars suit when three elements are 
present: “(1) a final judgment on the merits in a prior suit 
involving (2) the same parties or their privies and (3) a 
subsequent suit based on the same cause of action.”  Lubrizol 
Corp. v. Exxon Corp., 929 F.2d 960, 963 (3d Cir. 1991).  In 
evaluating whether those elements exist, we do not proceed 
mechanically, “but focus on the central purpose of the 
doctrine, to require a plaintiff to present all claims arising out 
of the same occurrence in a single suit.  In so doing, we avoid 
piecemeal litigation and conserve judicial resources.”  Blunt 
v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 767 F.3d 247, 277 (3d Cir. 2014) 
(internal quotation marks and brackets omitted), cert. denied, 
135 S. Ct. 1738 (2015).  “The purpose of res judicata is to 
‘relieve parties of the cost and vexation of multiple lawsuits, 
conserve judicial resources, and, by preventing inconsistent 
decisions, encourage reliance on adjudication.’”  Marmon 
Coal Co. v. Dir., Office of Workers’ Comp. Programs, 726 
F.3d 387, 394 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting Allen v. McCurry, 449 
U.S. 90, 94 (1980)).  To those ends, “[t]he doctrine of res 
judicata bars not only claims that were brought in a previous 
action, but also claims that could have been brought.”  In re 
Mullarkey, 536 F.3d 215, 225 (3d Cir. 2008). 
 
 Davis does not contest that the District Court’s 
dismissal of his claims in the 2012 action was a final 
judgment on the merits, nor does he dispute that the 2012 
action involved a claim against the same party, Wells Fargo.  
He contends instead that his prior suit “was not based on the 
same cause of action as the instant case” because he advanced 
a different legal theory in that lawsuit than he does now.  
(Opening Br. at 14.) 
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 Under our precedent, there is no single definition of 
“cause of action” for purposes of claim preclusion.  Rather, 
“[w]e … have explained that we take a broad view of what 
constitutes the same cause of action and that res judicata 
generally is thought to turn on the essential similarity of the 
underlying events giving rise to the various legal claims.”  
Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277 (internal quotation and editorial marks 
omitted).  In short, the focus is on facts rather than legal 
theories.  See Elkadrawy v. Vanguard Grp., 584 F.3d 169, 
173 (3d Cir. 2009) (The “analysis does not depend on the 
specific legal theory invoked … .”).  Res judicata bars a claim 
that “arises from the same set of facts as a claim adjudicated 
on the merits in the earlier litigation.”  Blunt, 767 F.3d at 277. 
 
 Davis filed his first federal complaint on October 18, 
2012, bringing claims against Wells Fargo for trespass and a 
violation of the SCRA.  He amended his complaint on 
December 7, 2012, including the same causes of action.6  
Davis’s current action brings claims against the bank for 
trespass, breach of contract, negligence, fraud, breach of the 
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violation 
of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding Company 
Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972.  He points to those additional claims 
and maintains that they are based on causes of action distinct 
from those that he asserted or could have asserted in 2012.  
He argues that those claims are necessarily different from his 
earlier ones because he was “completely unaware of the fraud 
perpetrated by Appellee Wells Fargo, in creating a fictitious 
                                              
 6 The additional factual allegations of the amended 
complaint are immaterial here, as they relate only to the 
duration of Davis’s military service spent on active duty as 
compared to his time as a reservist. 
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mortgage assignment” and “was unaware that in fact 
Appellee Wells Fargo, had already settled an insurance claim, 
financing repairs to the property” when he amended his 
complaint in the 2012 action.  (Opening Br. at 15.) 
 
 But the facts are against him.  Although Davis says 
that when he filed his amended complaint in 2012, he was 
ignorant of what Wells Fargo had done, all of the 
documentation on which he relies to assert his mortgage fraud 
claims was available to him well before that.  The allegations 
he made then – unlike the post hoc arguments he makes now 
– show that Davis was well aware of all of the operative facts 
prior to December 7, 2012, when he filed his amended 
complaint.  Most importantly, he has consistently 
acknowledged that he learned of the prior insurance claim on 
October 28, 2012, when his own separate claim was denied.  
Thus, as the District Court noted, “[a]ccording to his own 
statements, Davis knew all of the facts necessary to assert the 
‘new claims’ against Wells Fargo, at the very latest, over a 
month before he filed [his December 7, 2012] amended 
complaint.”  Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6.  None of the 
material facts alleged in Davis’s complaint occurred after the 
filing of the 2012 action.7  Other than to repeat his conclusory 
                                              
 7 The District Court was careful to note one 
“conclusory” allegation pertaining to something that occurred 
after Davis filed his amended complaint in the 2012 action 
(on December 7, 2012).  Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6 n.2.  
In paragraph 35 of his amended complaint in the present case, 
Davis alleges that “[o]n June 11, 2013, Wells Fargo 
negligently replaced the back wall [to the property] … but did 
not repair the roof which was the underlying cause of the wall 
collapse enabling the roof to continue to leak onto the wall 
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statement that he could not have raised his new claims in the 
previous action “because [he] had no knowledge of the facts 
underlying the new claims” (Opening Br. at 9), Davis offers 
nothing to rebut the District Court’s analysis. 
 
 Moreover, although Davis contends that he was 
“completely unaware” that Wells Fargo was assigned the 
mortgage on the Property at the time of the 2012 action, the 
allegedly fraudulent assignments upon which his claims rely 
were executed more than a year before the filing of his 2012 
amended complaint.  As he recites in his amended complaint 
in this action, those assignments were executed in February 
2008 and October 2011, respectively.  Surely Davis was 
aware or should have been aware of them, because he was 
then dealing with Wells Fargo as the purported mortgagee.  In 
                                                                                                     
and enable the back wall to continue to deteriorate again.”  
(S7 ¶35.)  However, the District Court rightly concluded that 
Davis’s negligence claim was still barred by res judicata 
because “the factual allegations in the amended complaint 
make clear that Davis’[s] negligence claim is based on Wells 
Fargo’s failure to repair the roof leak in October 2011.”  
Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6 n.2.  Davis’s negligence 
claim alleged that “Wells Fargo did not act reasonably when 
it took Plaintiff’s property before it had the legal right to do 
so, discovered a small roof leak while in possession of the 
property, filed an insurance claim for the leak, received 
settlement for the claim, fail[ed] to repair the roof leak with 
the money permitting the back wall to collapse and then 
return[ed] the property to Plaintiff in a dilapidated condition.”  
(S20 ¶117.)  Those allegations thus clearly relate to the failure 
to repair Davis’s property in late 2011, upon the initial 
discovery of the leak. 
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addition, as Davis alleges, “[t]he February 8, 2008 fraudulent 
assignment was recorded in Philadelphia County records on 
February 20, 2008.”  (S4.)  He identifies no impediment that 
would have prevented him from discovering the fraud 
purportedly evident in the plain language of those recorded 
assignments.  Thus, if Davis truly had been unaware of those 
assignments, his naiveté is not attributable to anyone but 
himself, and his opportunity to bring claims based on them 
closed when he failed to assert any such claim in his 2012 
action.8 
 
 In sum, Davis could have asserted his claims against 
Wells Fargo for breach of contract, negligence, fraud, breach 
of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and 
violation of the anti-tying provision of the Bank Holding 
                                              
 8 We hasten to add that we are not suggesting that the 
constructive notice afforded to the world by the recording of a 
document in accordance with applicable law gives actual 
knowledge of specific title transactions to an individual who 
is a stranger to the document recorded.  But here we are 
dealing with a situation in which the identity of the party 
claiming to be the mortgagee, Wells Fargo, was well known 
to Davis when he commenced the 2012 action.  Surely Davis 
had a motive to examine public records to see how Wells 
Fargo had become the mortgagee inasmuch as Davis executed 
the mortgage in favor of a different party, BNC.  In other 
words, events of which Davis was unquestionably aware 
should have signaled him to investigate how Wells Fargo 
could have claimed to be the mortgagee more than one year 
before he filed his 2012 action. 
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Company Act, 12 U.S.C. § 1972,9 in his 2012 action.   
Because he failed to do so, claim preclusion bars him from 
asserting them here.   Accordingly, we will affirm the District 
Court’s dismissal of those claims.  As far as Wells Fargo is 
concerned, that leaves only the trespass claim for us to 
address.10 
 
  (2) Statute of Limitations 
 
 Though claim preclusion does not bar Davis’s trespass 
claim,11 Pennsylvania’s applicable two-year statute of 
limitations does.  See 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(4).12  The 
                                              
 9 Davis’s anti-tying claim related to the force-placed 
insurance that was obtained in 2009, so that claim also could 
have been brought in the 2012 action. 
 
 10 Davis devotes a section of his brief to arguments 
against the application of collateral estoppel, or issue 
preclusion.  Claim preclusion and issue preclusion are distinct 
doctrines, and the District Court relied only on the former to 
dismiss certain of Davis’s claims.  Consequently, we have no 
occasion to address his arguments against the application of 
issue preclusion. 
 
 11 The trespass claim is not barred by res judicata 
because Davis did assert it in the prior action and it was not 
dismissed on the merits.  Instead, when dismissing the SCRA 
claim, the District Court declined to exercise jurisdiction over 
the trespass claim. 
 12 The parties do not dispute that Pennsylvania law 
applies. 
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District Court held that, because Davis alleged he was locked 
out of his property “from January 2008 through September 
2011,” his trespass claim was barred “at the very latest, as of 
September 2013.”  Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6.  The 
amended complaint, however, makes clear that Davis did not 
receive access to the property until September 2012, one year 
later than the District Court said.  Nevertheless, even 
measured from that later date, the two-year limitations period 
still would have expired by the time Davis initiated the 
present suit in December 2014.13   
                                              
 13 And perhaps the measuring point should be earlier, 
because the limitations period generally begins to run “as 
soon as the injury is sustained,” Mest v. Cabot Corp., 449 
F.3d 502, 510 (3d Cir. 2006) – in this case, when Davis was 
first locked out of the property in January 2008.  In general, 
“lack of knowledge, mistake or misunderstanding do not toll 
the running of the statute of limitations.”  Pocono Int’l 
Raceway, Inc. v. Pocono Produce, Inc., 468 A.2d 468, 471 
(Pa. 1983).  As an exception to that principle, Pennsylvania 
adheres to the “discovery rule,” which can, in limited 
circumstances, afford plaintiffs additional time for the filing 
of their claims.  But that rule only applies when the plaintiff is 
unable, “despite the exercise of diligence, to determine the 
injury or its cause … .”  Id.  The amended complaint gives no 
indication that Davis, through the exercise of reasonable 
diligence, could not have timely discovered either his 
expulsion from the property or the purported invalidity of 
Wells Fargo’s transactional documents.  Therefore, the 
discovery rule does not save Davis’s trespass claim. 
 But again, even under the most charitable reading of 
his amended complaint, the limitations period ended, at the 
very latest, in September 2014.  Either way, the statute of 
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 In apparent recognition that the statute of limitations 
had already run when he filed this action, Davis now contends 
that the limitations period should be equitably tolled because 
Wells Fargo “actively misled” him into believing that it was 
the mortgagee, though it “did not … have the note or a valid 
mortgage assignment for the property.”  (Opening Br. at 18-
19.)  Assuming that were true – as we must – we still can 
discern no reason why the invalidity of the assignment 
prevented Davis from filing his trespass claim. 
 
 We have held that equitable tolling may be appropriate 
under three primary, though not exclusive, circumstances: 
“(1) where the defendant has actively misled the plaintiff 
respecting the plaintiff’s cause of action; (2) where the 
plaintiff in some extraordinary way has been prevented from 
asserting his or her rights; or (3) where the plaintiff has timely 
asserted his or her rights mistakenly in the wrong forum.”  
Oshiver v. Levin, Fishbein, Sedran & Berman, 38 F.3d 1380, 
1387 (3d Cir. 1994) (citations omitted).  Davis relies on the 
first of those factors, but no matter what Wells Fargo told 
Davis about its status with regard to the Property, that should 
not have left him unable to assert his trespass claim.  Even if 
he believed until late in 2014 that Wells Fargo held the 
mortgage on the Property, it does not follow that the bank had 
the right to enter and lock him out before initiating 
foreclosure proceedings.  If he was misled at all, it was about 
a fact of marginal relevance to the trespass. 
 
 The 2012 action itself makes the point plainly.  Davis 
said in his amended complaint in that suit that Wells Fargo 
                                                                                                     
limitations had lapsed by the time Davis filed his complaint in 
December 2014. 
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was a trespasser because it “did not hold a possessory right to 
the property, it only held a mortgage lien.”  (S158.)  He 
obviously did not then think the validity of the mortgage 
assignment affected his possessory interest in the Property, 
and he was right.  We thus cannot hold that Davis was unable 
to know the basis for his trespass claim during the limitations 
period when he, in fact, made the trespass claim in his prior, 
timely-filed suit.14 
 
 Accordingly, Davis’s trespass claim is time-barred, 
and we will affirm the District Court’s dismissal of the claim 
on that basis.15 
                                              
 14 In dismissing the 2012 action, the District Court also 
explained that Davis would not be barred from reasserting his 
trespass claim in state court by the statute of limitations if he 
were to “promptly file[] a certified transcript of the judgment 
and pleadings filed in this action.”  (S 279 n.1.)  See 42 Pa. 
Cons. Stat. § 5103(b).  But Davis did not refile his trespass 
claim in state court, and the District Court in the current 
action determined that, in light of Davis’s two-year delay in 
refiling the claim in the District Court, it was time-barred by 
the two-year limitation period in 42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(4).  
Davis, 2015 WL 3555301, at *6.  There is nothing erroneous 
in that conclusion. 
 
 15 Although we affirm the District Court’s dismissal of 
Davis’s claims against Wells Fargo, we would be remiss if we 
did not add a note about the disturbing allegations he has 
made.  If they are true, the bank locked Davis out of his home 
before starting foreclosure proceedings, initiated a series of 
fraudulent assignments of the mortgage, and obtained 
insurance on the Property as part of a kickback scheme with 
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 B. Assurant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule  
  12(b)(1) 
 
 Assurant moved to dismiss Davis’s complaint on the 
basis that the District Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction.  
It argued that Davis lacked standing because he had 
                                                                                                     
the insurer while Davis paid excessive premiums.  Although 
the insurance should have covered the leak and damage to the 
wall, Wells Fargo allegedly settled the damage claim for a 
payment of $317 – for roof repairs – but then took no action 
to actually repair the roof.  And all of this took place during 
and around the time that Davis was serving three years of 
active duty in the United States Army in a time of war. 
 When asked about those facts during oral argument, 
Wells Fargo did not dispute their veracity, nor did its counsel 
seem particularly concerned about the brazenly exploitative 
character of the alleged actions of the bank.  In one telling 
portion of the argument, when asked whether the bank had 
the right to make an insurance claim, take money for a roof 
repair, and then pocket that money and not make the repair, 
all while knowing the result could be further deterioration and 
structural damage to the Property, counsel said simply, “that 
is what the mortgage gives them the right to do.”  See Oral 
Argument, 
http://www2.ca3.uscourts.gov/oralargument/audio/15-
2658Davisv.WellsFargo.mp3, at 19:13-19:38 (argued 
March 2, 2016).  If the allegations are true, they raise serious 
questions about bad faith that we are not now in a position to 
address.  Suffice it to say, however, that although we affirm 
the dismissal of Davis’s claims, we hope the allegations of the 
amended complaint do not reflect Wells Fargo’s actual 
business practices. 
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improperly sued Assurant rather than ASIC, its wholly-owned 
subsidiary.  We exercise plenary review over the District 
Court’s dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.  In re 
Schering Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class 
Action, 678 F.3d 235, 243 (3d Cir. 2012). 
 
 A challenge to subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 
12(b)(1) may be either a facial or a factual attack.  The former 
challenges subject matter jurisdiction without disputing the 
facts alleged in the complaint, and it requires the court to 
“consider the allegations of the complaint as true.”  Petruska 
v. Gannon Univ., 462 F.3d 294, 302 n.3 (3d Cir. 2006) 
(quoting Mortensen v. First Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n, 549 F.2d 
884, 891 (3d Cir. 1977)).  The latter, a factual challenge, 
attacks the factual allegations underlying the complaint’s 
assertion of jurisdiction, either through the filing of an answer 
or “otherwise present[ing] competing facts.”  Constitution 
Party of Pa. v. Aichele, 757 F.3d 347, 358 (3d Cir. 2014).  In 
contrast to a facial challenge, a factual challenge allows “a 
court [to] weigh and consider evidence outside the 
pleadings.”  Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).  When a 
factual challenge is made, “the plaintiff will have the burden 
of proof that jurisdiction does in fact exist,” and the court “is 
free to weigh the evidence and satisfy itself as to the existence 
of its power to hear the case.”  Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.  
“[N]o presumptive truthfulness attaches to [the] plaintiff’s 
allegations … .”  Id.  Although we exercise plenary review 
over the District Court’s legal conclusions, we review the 
Court’s findings of fact, including findings related to 
jurisdiction, only for clear error.  CNA v. United States, 535 
F.3d 132, 139 (3d Cir. 2008). 
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 Here, because it submitted a signed declaration 
disputing Davis’s factual allegations, Assurant has mounted a 
factual challenge to subject matter jurisdiction.  See Int’l 
Ass’n of Machinists & Aerospace Workers v. Nw. Airlines, 
Inc., 673 F.2d 700, 711 (3d Cir. 1982) (“[Defendant’s] 
motion was supported by a sworn statement of facts.  It 
therefore must be construed as a factual, rather than a facial 
attack … .”).  Assurant had one of its corporate officers 
declare that ASIC has a separate corporate existence from its 
parent, that Assurant is not involved in ASIC’s daily business 
operations, and that Assurant itself has never contracted or 
done business with Davis.  Given the claimed distinction 
between Assurant and ASIC, Assurant argued – and the 
District Court agreed – that Davis lacked standing to claim 
that Assurant was liable for breach of contract, negligence, 
fraud, and bad faith dealing. 
 
 Standing is a jurisdictional matter.  “Absent Article III 
standing, a federal court does not have subject matter 
jurisdiction to address a plaintiff’s claims, and they must be 
dismissed.”  Taliaferro v. Darby Twp. Zoning Bd., 458 F.3d 
181, 188 (3d Cir. 2006).  The Supreme Court has recognized 
that “the irreducible constitutional minimum of standing 
contains three elements,” which the party invoking federal 
jurisdiction must establish.  Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 
504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992).  First, the plaintiff must show that 
he suffered an “injury in fact,” meaning a concrete and 
particularized invasion of a legally protected interest.  Id.  
Second, the plaintiff must demonstrate a “causal connection 
between the injury and the conduct complained of – the injury 
has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action of the 
defendant, and not the result of the independent action of 
some third party not before the court.” Id. (internal quotation 
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and editorial marks omitted).  “Third, it must be likely, as 
opposed to merely speculative, that the injury will be 
redressed by a favorable decision.” Id. at 561 (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
 
 Assurant’s standing argument focuses on the latter two 
elements of the standing analysis, traceability and 
redressability.  Assurant contends that its subsidiary, ASIC, is 
the actual carrier of the insurance and that, given the 
distinction between Assurant and ASIC, Davis’s alleged 
injury is not fairly traceable to Assurant’s conduct.  Thus, 
says Assurant, a judgment against it would do nothing to 
redress the harm that Davis supposedly suffered at the hands 
of ASIC.  While that argument has some superficial appeal, it 
is wrong.  Assurant’s argument is better understood as a well-
disguised challenge to the legal merits of Davis’s case, not as 
a challenge to his standing to pursue it. 
 
 Taking the argument from its start, Assurant says that 
ASIC, its wholly-owned subsidiary, should have been the 
named defendant in Davis’s complaint.  But that is a matter 
open to reasonable dispute.  Assurant and ASIC are related 
entities and the extent of their intertwined operations is a 
matter that has not yet been tested by the adversary process.  
Even if Assurant were to assert that it had absolutely no 
relationship with ASIC, however, its argument ought still to 
be treated as going to the merits of the case.  Like all merits 
arguments, the question of whether a plaintiff has sued the 
correct defendant should ordinarily be addressed at the 
 24 
 
pleading stage by affording the plaintiff the protections 
provided by Rule 12(b)(6).16 
 
 Assurant acknowledges that parent corporations may 
be held liable for the actions of their subsidiaries under 
certain conditions, but it argues that Davis’s complaint “does 
not make a single factual averment that would support a claim 
for piercing the corporate veil.”  (Assurant Br. at 15.)  It thus 
uses its declaration to establish a factual predicate (i.e., the 
distinction between ASIC and Assurant) for a legal argument 
addressed squarely to the merits of Davis’s complaint (i.e., 
the inability to pierce the corporate veil to hold Assurant 
liable for ASIC’s actions).  But, if we accept the factual 
allegations of the complaint, as we would under Rule 
12(b)(6), the distinction between ASIC and Assurant is not 
established and, in fact, is irrelevant.  There is no veil to 
pierce because Davis says Assurant is the insurance carrier on 
                                              
 16 We do not believe that the phrasing chosen by the 
Supreme Court in setting out the second Lujan factor – that 
“the injury has to be fairly traceable to the challenged action 
of the defendant, and not the result of the independent action 
of some third party not before the court,” 504 U.S. at 560 
(internal quotation and editorial marks omitted) – was meant 
to transform ordinary merits arguments about who is legally 
responsible for an injury into questions of jurisdiction.  Our 
cases have instead treated traceability as a question of 
causation, asking whether a plaintiff has “allege[d] facts that 
plausibly support a causal connection between [the plaintiff]’s 
injury-in-fact and [the defendant’s conduct].”  In re Schering 
Plough Corp. Intron/Temodar Consumer Class Action, 678 
F.3d 235, 247 (3d Cir. 2012).  See infra note 19 and 
accompanying text. 
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the policy in question.  With the factual foundation for its 
argument removed, Assurant’s position has little persuasive 
force.  Its contention that ASIC is the proper defendant may, 
in the end, be a strong merits defense against Davis’s claims, 
but it does not mean that Davis does not have standing to 
bring his claims, and to bring them against Assurant.  Cf. 
Official Comm. of Unsecured Creditors v. R.F. Lafferty & 
Co., 267 F.3d 340, 346 (3d Cir. 2001) (“Whether a party has 
standing to bring claims and whether a party’s claims are 
barred by an equitable defense are two separate questions, to 
be addressed on their own terms.”). 
 
 The standing requirement is analytically distinct from 
the merits of the underlying dispute.  Standing is meant to 
serve as “an essential and unchanging part of the case-or-
controversy requirement of Article III.”  Lujan, 504 U.S. at 
560.  Here, Davis has alleged that Assurant breached a 
contract and committed various state-law torts.  If for no other 
reason, a case or controversy exists to determine whether 
Davis is suing the right insurance company and, even if he 
should have sued ASIC, whether he may pierce the corporate 
veil and hold Assurant accountable for the alleged 
misconduct of ASIC.  Davis argues that Assurant may be held 
responsible; Assurant argues that it may not.  That is a merits 
question. 
 
 Assurant’s assertions to the contrary prove too much.  
If accepted, they would allow any litigant whose defense is 
“you’ve got the wrong party” to frame that lack-of-
responsibility defense not as a merits challenge to be tried or 
to be considered under Rule 12(b)(6) or the summary 
judgment provisions of Rule 56 but as a Rule 12(b)(1) 
standing challenge, thereby empowering the defendant to 
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buttress its legal arguments with factual assertions that 
contradict those in the complaint.  Although standing and 
merits questions may involve overlapping facts, standing is 
generally an inquiry about the plaintiff: is this the right person 
to bring this claim.  See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 818 
(1997) (“The standing inquiry focuses on whether the 
plaintiff is the proper party to bring this suit … .”); Flast v. 
Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99 (1968) (“The fundamental aspect of 
standing is that it focuses on the party seeking to get his 
complaint before a federal court and not on the issues he 
wishes to have adjudicated.”).  It is generally not an inquiry 
into whether the plaintiff has got the right defendant. 
 
 The confusion generated by Assurant is a new iteration 
of an old problem.  We have already held that “a district court 
must take care not to reach the merits of a case when deciding 
a Rule 12(b)(1) motion.”  CNA, 535 F.3d at 144.  
“Jurisdictional finding of genuinely disputed facts is 
inappropriate when the jurisdictional issue and substantive 
issues are so intertwined that the question of jurisdiction is 
dependent on the resolution of factual issues going to the 
merits of an action.”  Sun Valley Gasoline, Inc. v. Ernst 
Enters, Inc., 711 F.2d 138, 139 (9th Cir. 1983) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  As we stated in Kulick v. Pocono 
Downs Racing Association, when a factual challenge to 
jurisdiction attacks facts at the core of the merits of the 
underlying cause of action, “the proper procedure for the 
district court is to find that jurisdiction exists and to deal with 
the objection as a direct attack on the merits of the plaintiff’s 
case.”  816 F.2d 895, 898 n.5 (3d Cir. 1987) (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
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 We have repeatedly cautioned against allowing a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter 
jurisdiction to be turned into an attack on the merits.  E.g., 
Gould Elecs. Inc. v. United States, 220 F.3d 169, 178 (3d Cir. 
2000); Growth Horizons, Inc. v. Delaware Cty., Pa., 983 F.2d 
1277, 1280-81 (3d Cir. 1993); Kehr Packages, Inc. v. 
Fidelcor, Inc., 926 F.2d 1406, 1408-09 (3d Cir. 1991); 
Kulick, 816 F.2d at 897; Johnsrud v. Carter, 620 F.2d 29, 32-
33 (3d Cir. 1980); Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.  Caution is 
necessary because the standards governing the two rules 
differ markedly, as Rule 12(b)(6) provides greater procedural 
safeguards for plaintiffs than does Rule 12(b)(1).  First, 
proceeding under Rule 12(b)(1) inverts the burden of 
persuasion.  When presenting a Rule 12(b)(6) motion, the 
defendant bears the burden to show that the plaintiff has not 
stated a claim.  Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1409.  But under 
Rule 12(b)(1), the plaintiff must prove the court has subject 
matter jurisdiction.  Id.  The two rules also treat the 
complaint’s factual allegations very differently.  Unlike Rule 
12(b)(6), under which a defendant cannot contest the 
plaintiff’s factual allegations, Rule 12(b)(1) allows a 
defendant to attack the allegations in the complaint and 
submit contrary evidence in its effort to show that the court 
lacks jurisdiction.  Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 891.  Thus, 
improper consideration of a merits question under Rule 
12(b)(1) significantly raises both the factual and legal burden 
on the plaintiff.  Given the differences between the two rules, 
“[a] plaintiff may be prejudiced if what is, in essence, a Rule 
12(b)(6) challenge to the complaint is treated as a Rule 
12(b)(1) motion.”  Kehr Packages, 926 F.2d at 1409.17 
                                              
 17 We addressed that prejudice clearly in Kulick.  816 
F.2d at 897.  There, a horse owner brought a civil rights 
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 Rule 12(b)(6) – with its attendant procedural and 
substantive protections for plaintiffs – is the proper vehicle 
for the early testing of a plaintiff’s claims.  Assurant does not 
contend that Davis is the wrong person to bring his claims.  
Rather, it argues that he has filed suit against the wrong party, 
that his claims against Assurant are actually without merit 
because Assurant has done nothing wrong.  That may be true, 
and, if so, the ordinary course of litigation will root it out.  
But Assurant may not short-circuit the usual process, flip the 
                                                                                                     
action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against a racing association, 
alleging that he had been ejected from a racetrack without due 
process.  The district court dismissed the case for want of 
subject matter jurisdiction, because the plaintiff had failed to 
establish that the defendant’s actions were taken under color 
of state law, as required under § 1983.  We reversed, 
recognizing that “a court has jurisdiction over the dispute so 
long as the plaintiff alleges that defendant’s actions violate 
the requisite federal law … .  Once the plaintiff has met this 
threshold pleading requirement, however, the truth of the 
facts alleged in the complaint is a question on the merits, as is 
the legal question whether the facts alleged establish a 
violation.”  Id. at 897-98.  We emphasized that, were it 
“[o]therwise, the district court could turn an attack on the 
merits, against which the party has the procedural protections 
of a full trial including the right to a jury, into an attack on 
jurisdiction, which a court may resolve at any time without a 
jury pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) 
and 12(h)(3).”  Id. at 898.  In reversing, we held that the 
district court should not have treated its findings of fact “as 
conclusive on the issue of jurisdiction because the presence of 
state action was properly a concern not of jurisdiction but of 
the merits.”  Id. at 896. 
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burden of persuasion, and permit itself to submit competing 
facts to support its argument.   
 
Jurisdiction … is not defeated as [Assurant] 
seem[s] to contend, by the possibility that the 
averments might fail to state a cause of action 
on which [Davis] could actually recover.  For it 
is well settled that the failure to state a proper 
cause of action calls for a judgment on the 
merits and not for a dismissal for want of 
jurisdiction. 
 
Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 682 (1946). 
 
 In light of its limited protections for plaintiffs, Rule 
12(b)(1) must not be expanded beyond its proper purpose.18  
The Supreme Court has authorized courts to dismiss under 
Rule 12(b)(1) for lack of jurisdiction due to merits-related 
defects in only narrow categories of cases.  “[A] suit may 
sometimes be dismissed for want of jurisdiction where the 
alleged claim under the Constitution or federal statutes clearly 
appears to be immaterial and made solely for the purpose of 
obtaining jurisdiction or where such a claim is wholly 
insubstantial and frivolous.”  Bell, 327 U.S. at 682-83.  
“[D]ismissal for lack of jurisdiction is not appropriate merely 
because the legal theory alleged is probably false, but only 
because the right claimed is ‘so insubstantial, implausible, 
foreclosed by prior decisions of this Court, or otherwise 
                                              
 18 Uniquely, Rule 12(b)(1) allows a district court to 
make findings of fact that contradict the allegations in the 
complaint, at the very outset of litigation, before any 
discovery has taken place. 
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completely devoid of merit as not to involve a federal 
controversy.’”  Kulick, 816 F.2d at 899 (quoting Oneida 
Indian Nation v. Cty. of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 666 (1974)).  
In this vein, when a case raises a disputed factual issue that 
goes both to the merits and jurisdiction, district courts must 
“demand less in the way of jurisdictional proof than would be 
appropriate at a trial stage.”  Mortensen, 549 F.2d at 892 
(holding that dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) would be 
“unusual” when the facts necessary to succeed on the merits 
are at least in part the same as must be alleged or proven to 
withstand jurisdictional attacks).  Given the tightly 
circumscribed definition of these categories, dismissal via a 
Rule 12(b)(1) factual challenge to standing should be granted 
sparingly.  Here, Davis’s claims against Assurant are not so 
insubstantial as to fall within those categories.19 
 
 The District Court erroneously accepted Assurant’s 
standing argument.  In doing so, it shifted to Davis the burden 
of persuasion that properly falls on Assurant on a motion to 
                                              
 19 It is possible, of course, to imagine a plaintiff who 
sues Corporation X on a claim that it is responsible for a civil 
war somewhere on the other side of the planet.  To establish 
its standing, that plaintiff would have to satisfy the second 
Lujan factor and show an injury “fairly traceable to the 
challenged action of the defendant, and not the result of the 
independent action of some third party not before the court.”  
Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560 (internal quotation and editorial marks 
omitted).  That is, we believe, the kind of implausible 
allegation the Supreme Court had in mind when it crafted the 
exception permitting dismissal under Rule 12(b)(1) for 
wholly insubstantial claims to jurisdiction. 
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dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), and deprived him of the 
deference due the factual allegations of his complaint.  
Accordingly, we will vacate the District Court’s order insofar 
as it concluded that it was without subject matter jurisdiction 
over Davis’s claims against Assurant. 20 
 
C. Assurant’s Motion to Dismiss Under Rule  
  12(b)(6) 
 
 Assurant also moved to dismiss pursuant to Rule 
12(b)(6), which the District Court did not address given its 
dismissal of the case under Rule 12(b)(1).  Since we may 
affirm on any basis supported by the record, Guthrie v. Lady 
Jane Collieries, Inc., 722 F.2d 1141, 1144-45 (3d Cir. 1983), 
we now consider that 12(b)(6) motion. 
 
 Reviewing Assurant’s arguments under Rule 12(b)(6) 
rather than Rule 12(b)(1) means that Assurant’s declaration 
                                              
 20 In support of its argument, Assurant cites several 
cases in which it has persuaded district courts across the 
country that its standing argument is meritorious.  Montoya v. 
PNC Bank, N.A., No. 14-20474-CIV, 2014 WL 4248208, at 
*5 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 27, 2014); Cochran-May v. Wells Fargo 
Bank, NA, No. 2:12-cv-240, 2014 WL 361177, at *2 (S.D. 
Tex. Feb. 3, 2014); Xi Chen Lauren v. PNC Bank, N.A., No. 
2:13-cv-762, 2013 WL 5565511, at *4 (W.D. Pa. Oct. 8, 
2013); Roberts v. Wells Fargo Bank, N.A., No. 4:12-cv-200, 
2013 WL 1233268, at *7 (S.D. Ga. Mar. 27, 2013); Cannon 
v. Wells Fargo Bank N.A., 917 F. Supp. 2d 1025, 1032 (N.D. 
Cal. 2013).  We have considered each of those cases and, 
insofar as they accept Assurant’s standing argument under 
Rule 12(b)(1), we reject their reasoning. 
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distinguishing itself from ASIC cannot factor into our 
analysis, and we must accept the well-pleaded facts of the 
amended complaint as true.  Along with those facts, we may 
also consider “exhibits attached to the complaint[,] matters of 
public record,” and documents “integral to or explicitly relied 
upon in the complaint.”  Schmidt v. Skolas, 770 F.3d 241, 249 
(3d Cir. 2014) (internal quotation marks and emphasis 
omitted).  Although we are usually confined to the allegations 
of the complaint, “the justification for the integral documents 
exception is that it is not unfair to hold a plaintiff accountable 
for the contents of documents [he] must have used in framing 
[his] complaint, nor should a plaintiff be able to evade 
accountability for such documents simply by not attaching 
them to his complaint.”  Id. at 250. 
 
 We start with Davis’s breach of contract claim.  To 
make out that claim, Davis must allege facts giving rise to a 
reasonable inference that discovery will reveal evidence that 
“there was a contract, [Assurant] breached it, and [he] 
suffered damages from the breach.”  McShea v. City of 
Philadelphia, 995 A.2d 334, 340 (Pa. 2010).21  In his 
amended complaint, Davis alleges that he had an insurance 
contract with Assurant and that Assurant breached the 
contract by failing to “adequately investigate and pay the roof 
leak claim … which led to and caused the back wall of 
[Davis’s] property to deteriorate and collapse.”  (S16.)  
Assurant’s response is that, given the distinction between 
ASIC and Assurant, it “does not have any contractual 
relationship with [Davis].”  (Assurant Br. at 23.)  But the 
                                              
 21 Again, there is no dispute that Pennsylvania law 
applies. 
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distinction between ASIC and Assurant is only established by 
the very declaration that we must ignore in ruling on 
Assurant’s 12(b)(6) motion.  Further, there are at least two 
integral documents attached as exhibits to the amended 
complaint – the letters settling the first insurance claim and 
denying Davis’s second claim – indicating that an insurance 
contract existed between Davis and an insurer using 
letterhead bearing the names of both “American Security 
Insurance Company” and “ASSURANT Specialty Property.”  
(S92, 105 (original emphasis).)22  Thus, Assurant’s name 
appeared, in bolded font, at the top of the letter denying 
Davis’s insurance claim.23   Viewing the allegations of the 
complaint and integral documents in the light most favorable 
to Davis – and ignoring the facts set out in Assurant’s 
declaration – we cannot say that those documents fail to 
“raise a reasonable expectation that discovery will uncover 
proof” that a contract existed between Davis and Assurant, 
that Assurant breached the contract, and that it thereby caused 
damage to Davis’s Property.  Connelly v. Lane Constr. Corp., 
                                              
 22 These two letters are integral to Davis’s amended 
complaint because he clearly “relied upon these documents in 
framing the complaint.”  In re Burlington Coat Factory Sec. 
Litig., 114 F.3d 1410, 1426 (3d Cir. 1997) (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 
 23 In its brief, Assurant cites those same two 
documents, noting that they “are correspondence clearly 
returnable and pertaining to [Davis’s] insurance policy with 
ASIC, as indicated by the ASIC returnable addresses across 
the top of each.”  (Assurant Br. at 24.)  Assurant neglects to 
mention that both documents also bear its own name in bold, 
in the largest font on the page, in their upper-left-hand corner. 
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809 F.3d 780, 789 (3d Cir. 2016).  Accordingly, dismissal 
under Rule 12(b)(6) of Davis’s breach of contract claim 
against Assurant is not warranted. 
 
 Although Davis’s breach of contract claim survives, he 
cannot bring a separate bad faith claim against Assurant.  
“[U]nder Pennsylvania law, a ‘claim for breach of the implied 
covenant of good faith and fair dealing is subsumed in a 
breach of contract claim.’”  Burton v. Teleflex Inc., 707 F.3d 
417, 432 (3d Cir. 2013) (quoting LSI Title Agency, Inc. v. 
Evaluation Servs., Inc., 951 A.2d 384, 392 (Pa. Super. Ct. 
2008)).  In other words, Davis cannot maintain a bad faith 
claim “separate and distinct from a breach of contract claim.  
Rather, a claim arising from a breach of the covenant of good 
faith must be prosecuted as a breach of contract claim, as the 
covenant does nothing more than imply certain obligations 
into the contract itself.”  JHE, Inc. v. Se. Pa. Transp. Auth., 
No. 1790, 2002 WL 1018941, at *5 (Pa. Com. Pl. May 17, 
2002).  Because Davis cannot maintain an independent cause 
of action for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing under Pennsylvania law, that claim should be 
dismissed and his arguments concerning bad faith should be 
addressed in connection with his surviving breach of contract 
claim. 
 
 We also agree with Assurant’s argument that Davis’s 
negligence and fraud claims are time barred under 
Pennsylvania’s applicable two-year statute of limitations.  See 
42 Pa. Cons. Stat. § 5524(7).  With respect to the negligence 
claim, Davis alleged that Assurant “breached its duty of care 
to [him] when it failed to investigate, estimate and pay 
[Davis’s] roof leak claim leaving the property unrepaired and 
exposed to the elements which caused the back wall to 
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deteriorate, collapse and grow toxic black mold that spread 
throughout the house.”  (S21.)  As previously discussed, 
Davis knew that Assurant denied his insurance claim 
regarding the roof leak by (at the latest) October 28, 2012, 
more than two years before he filed suit in December 2014.  
The same is true of Davis’s fraud claim, which is premised on 
the purported kickback scheme between Wells Fargo and 
Assurant and on Assurant’s coverage responses to the 
Property’s roof leak.  The insurance policy was placed on the 
property in April 2009, and Assurant denied Davis’s 
insurance claim on October 28, 2012.  Thus, by the time 
Davis filed his complaint in December 2014, his fraud claim 
was also barred by the two-year statute of limitations.  
Nothing in the amended complaint or the documents integral 
to it suggests that the statute of limitations should be tolled 
for any reason, and Davis – by not filing a reply brief 
addressed to any of Assurant’s 12(b)(6) arguments – has not 
argued for tolling in this regard.24 
 
 Accordingly, on remand, Davis’s sole surviving claim 
is his breach of contract claim against Assurant.25 
                                              
 24 Assurant also contends that Davis’s fraud claim 
should be dismissed because it fails to meet the heightened 
pleading requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 
9(b), which requires averments of fraud to be “state[d] with 
particularity.”  Because we dismiss Davis’s fraud claim by 
application of the statute of limitations, we need not address 
that argument. 
 
 25 Finally, we will also affirm the District Court’s order 
insofar as it denied Davis’s motion to amend the (already) 
amended complaint.  Davis has not addressed the denial of 
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III. CONCLUSION 
 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the District 
Court’s order in part, vacate it in part, and remand for further 
proceedings consistent with this opinion. 
                                                                                                     
leave to amend anywhere in his brief, and “[w]e have 
consistently held that [a]n issue is waived unless a party 
raises it in its opening brief.”  In re Fosamax (Alendronate 
Sodium) Products Liab. Litig. (No. II), 751 F.3d 150, 157 (3d 
Cir. 2014) (second alteration in original) (citation and internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
